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Abstract
This paper examines developments in the market for domestic electricity supply in the
UK since September 1998 when the market was thrown over to competition using a
variety of sources including firm interviews and a consumer questionnaire.  We find that
there was a substantial amount of entry, but that there has since been significant
consolidation.  There is still a substantial gap between the prices set by a firm in its
incumbent area and prices obtainable from entrants to the market.  There is no evidence
that the market is near to Bertrand in operation.
1. Introduction
Economists are fundamentally interested in markets and the development and
performance of these markets.  However, it is seldom possible to find a market
developing quickly enough that it can be observed in real time. A series of exceptions is
provided by those markets previously seriously restricted that are opened up to
competition by administrative fiat1.  The classic case is deregulation of the US airline
industry (see e.g. Berry, 1992, Borenstein, 1989, Joskow et al., 1994 and Winston and
Collins, 1992).  However in that industry the idea of competition following deregulation
was easily conceptualised by consumers since they had previously observed some
competition, albeit muted and often focusing upon relatively trivial issues.  More
interesting is the restructuring and deregulation of utility markets, where there was
normally no previous history to guide consumer expectations.  Nowhere has this process
proceeded further (at time of writing) than the UK, where all energy consumers now may
purchase their energy requirements from whomsoever they wish (amongst the large
number of companies licensed).  Our aim in this paper is to examine the development of
competition in the domestic electricity supply market in the UK.  We investigate the
process of consolidation following large scale entry and consider whether the market can
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2become competitive in operation whilst maintaining a significant number of competitors
given the essentially homogeneous nature of the product2.
Upon privatisation in 1990, the electricity industry in England and Wales was split into
four vertical levels: generation, transmission, distribution and supply. (In contrast, the
industry in Scotland remained vertically integrated but consisted of two geographically –
separated players.)  Generation was seen as potentially competitive even with two main
players, although subsequent developments led to injection of a greater degree of
competition.  Transmission and distribution, on the other hand, were viewed as naturally
monopolistic and therefore required regulation.  Supply was considered to be potentially
competitive, after a transition period in which incumbent suppliers were to be regulated
and during which supply competition proceeded in stages dependent upon size of
(industrial) customer. (Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers, 1994, Ch 9). The conceptual split
of the domestic market into (non-competitive) distribution and (potentially competitive)
supply was quite novel for consumers; privatisation of the telecoms market had not
prepared consumers for such a dramatic change.
The domestic supply market was opened up to competition in stages, commencing in
September 1998 and finalised by end March 2002.  In order to facilitate the development
of competition in domestic supply, the necessary transmission and distribution facilities
are sold by the monopoly suppliers to all comers at very transparent and regulated prices,
and other ancillary facilities such as meter reading are easily available. Transfer protocols
are also regulated.  Hence any supplier has access to information and a contractual
framework enabling them to calculate how much they will need to charge to cover
facilities other than those they provide themselves3.  Previously, each of the 14
geographical regions of Great Britain for electricity supply and distribution purposes had
a regulated Public Electricity Supplier (PES).  Hence in each region, there was an
incumbent or default supplier, who also remained as the distributor.  These companies
began competing for supply business outside their area; in many cases they offered to
supply in most other regions (the main exception being a limited willingness to engage in
competition in the extremities of the country such as the north of Scotland).
In addition to competition arising from existing supply companies extending across to
other areas, British Gas (with the trading name Scottish Gas in Scotland) - the national
incumbent in gas supply - entered the market in September 1998, aggressively marketing
themselves as competing for electricity business in England and Wales (Scotland).   In
addition, various other companies decided to move into the market.  These have included
Independent Energy (September 1998), Basic Power (December 1999), Atlantic Electric
and Gas (October 2000), Amerada (January 2001; an early entrant into the gas supply
market), Cambridge Gas and Electric (April 2001). As a result, the typical consumer was,
very soon after competition opened up in their area, able to purchase electricity from up
to around 15 companies, all charging different tariffs and having somewhat different
policies.  However, consolidation has been very rapid so that by end 2002, the domestic
                                                
2 As a result of differences in structure and complexities in pricing, electricity is a significantly more
interesting example than domestic gas in terms of strategic behaviour on price and other instruments.
3 Around 30% of the typical bill constitutes supply costs (source: OFGEM).
3consumer must normally choose from less than half that number of suppliers.  Thus there
is a considerable and rapid degree of change in the market structure, making it a very
interesting market to study.
Our approach to studying the market in this paper encompasses evidence from company
interviews and consumer questionnaires4 together with information from Office of Gas
and Electricity Markets (OFGEM) and “Energywatch” publications5. Our company
interviews were conducted in two rounds, which took place from April to July 2000 and
February to April 2002 respectively. In the first round 42 managers were interviewed in
12 gas and electricity companies, which represented all of the incumbents in the industry
at the time of the research. In the second round, a total of nine managers were
interviewed from two of the incumbent companies and an independent entrant. The
interviews were semi-structured and covered a series of issues including competitive
strategies, regulatory affairs and Ofgem’s social action plan6. In most companies the
interviews involved three or four managers who had responsibility for strategy,
marketing, pricing, regulatory affairs and customer operations. All of the interviews were
transcribed verbatim, coded and analysed using a qualitative software package, NVivo.
For reasons of confidentiality we do not quote individual managers and companies by
name in the following analysis. In the second round of company interviews we were able
to analyse the interview responses against evidence about the companies’ tariff structures,
their performance as regards complaints and their market performance.
Section 2 considers the introduction of competition and response of consumers to the
offers with which they are presented, whilst section 3 looks at what the different
companies offer.  The outcomes that result are discussed in section 4 and then section 5
concludes.
2. The introduction of competition and response of consumers
When the energy markets were first opened up, it was not clear how consumers would
react.  Based in part on experience in the business energy markets, some commentators
expected a very aggressive competitive process to occur approximating to a Bertrand
game in which price would be driven quickly to near marginal cost and the number of
competitors would shrink accordingly.  Given this conceptual framework, together with
the significance of fixed costs, considerable turbulence could be anticipated.  Indeed, the
gas market (the first to be liberalised) was opened to competition gradually area by area
as a result of fears of instability and inability to cope with a rush of switching consumers.
Resulting from the need for a much more precise balance between supply and demand,
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4coupled with its larger size and complexity, the electricity supply market was also opened
to competition in stages, despite the experience of rather limited consumer switching in
gas. Upon opening, it attracted a lot of potential interest from companies used to handling
mass market consumer relationships (for example supermarket chains) but some of this
failed to materialise into actual entry.  Nevertheless, there was significant entry as we
have already said.
The evidence of our consumer questionnaires (see Giulietti et al., 2001) shows that
consumers do have a significant reluctance to change supplier.  Although price is clearly
an important dimension of consumer choice, reputation of the existing supplier is also a
factor, as are the perceived costs of switching (which may in significant part represent
lethargy) and a belief that their existing supplier will be forced to price match.  If price
matching were a fact, competitive processes would plausibly do the work for you.
However, such behaviour has been limited.  Also, initially at least, consumers would have
significant uncertainty regarding matters such as service standards and what to expect
upon switching.
In fact, although it is natural to think of electricity as a homogeneous product, there are
several dimensions over which competition can occur.  There are three basic payment
methods to suit different customer types- Direct Debit (paying a fixed monthly amount
automatically), Standard Credit (paying in full in arrears, normally quarterly) and
Prepayment (paying via tokens or some similar device into the meter in advance).  There
is the choice to use “Economy 7” for customers with electrical central heating on the
storage heater model.  Electricity can be bundled with gas in a “dual fuel” deal.  The
company’s tariff can be structured so as to appeal to smaller or larger consumers (e.g. by
modifying the elements in the two- or more- part tariff).  Thus, by focusing on a subset of
these activities, the suppliers can and do specialise.  Through our observation of the
tariffs set in practice, and evaluation of the best buy across each of these categories, we
can discern what appears to be company strategy in each case on the natural assumption
that tariffs are designed to reflect company strategy. Our company interviews can then
elaborate on the companies’ strategies.
Table 1 lists the various types of tariff that are available and, using the Energywatch
website as a source, evaluates the number of lowest price offers each of the current
players offers to consumers over the various dimensions and regions of Great Britain.
Thus taking the first line as an example, for “low users” on direct debit and not on
economy 7 or a dual fuel deal, Basic Power provides the lowest total bill in one of the 14
electricity regions of  Great Britain, London is the lowest price in 3 regions, Powergen in
7, Seeboard in 2 and Southern and Scottish in 3.   A figure of 14 indicates a company is
the best buy in every region for that particular combination of figures; totalling more than
14 mean there are companies trying for the lowest price position.  Yet the overall
impression is that companies with the greatest number of “best buys” are not necessarily
the large players; Basic Power is a small- scale supplier.  We return to more detailed
examination of the table later.
53. Company pricing and service
One thing that has become apparent is the significant benefits to being the incumbent in
an electricity supply market.  Thus rather than competition being Bertrand in nature, a
modified version of the simplest model of the industry structure would have an
incumbent in each market providing an umbrella for an essentially competitive fringe.  It
is apparent from tariff structures that the incumbent is in every case able to charge a price
significantly above competing price offers long term whilst retaining a majority of its
customers; none has lost as much as 50% of its original customer base (source, OFGEM).
Based upon the average tariffs existing in the first six months of 2002, for someone on
average consumption paying by direct debit (the payment method most amenable to
switching supplier), by staying with their incumbent supplier they are paying over 9%
more than if they switched to the median alternative supplier (with correspondingly
greater savings if they switch to the cheapest supplier).  Turning to interview evidence,
we have for example, from a manager interviewed in one of the companies in the second
round, “We also found … that 34% of our customer base … would never move whatever
we did…”. Assuming this phenomenon is true more generally, the electricity supply
market appears more like a market where there is a leader (in each area) plus a
competitive fringe.
It seems not to be the case that customers are paying a premium entirely or even
primarily for an established “name” in the supply business.  Two of the companies who
are significant market players, Powergen, and TXU, dropped their traditional names in
their incumbent area in favour of a national brand name whilst retaining a substantial
incumbency premium.  In both cases, their margin over the median alternative on the
same basis as above is 6.8%.  The other players, for example London Electricity, have
chosen to retain old names for local areas taken over (SWEB), but do not necessarily
retain a greater proportion of customers.  Thus it appears that loyalty to a company name
is not a major factor in dissuading customers from leaving the incumbent as their current
supplier for another supplier.  Most of the market players are an incumbent in some
sense, either an incumbent electricity supplier or an incumbent gas supplier (BG) and
therefore are likely to benefit from an incumbency premium.
One strategy that might have been pursued by incumbent electricity suppliers is to avoid
competing “out of area” altogether.  Thus a collusive agreement not to take business from
other incumbents, in exchange for their (implicit) agreement not to do likewise, might
have been feasible, given that it would have required the absence of an action, rather than
any positive action.  It would have allowed them to maintain an incumbency premium
over a larger group of customers and have avoided significant marketing costs.  However,
this clearly did not take place, given the swift entry into other areas.  Incumbent
electricity companies therefore price discriminate by region, charging a relatively high
price in their home region (in virtually all cases, their charge is at the top of the local
distribution of tariffs in the case of direct debit and quarterly billed customers) and lower
6prices elsewhere in order to attract new business.  Tariffs vary by region for cost reasons
(distribution, transmission and generating costs), so the discrimination is effected either
by means of a tariff varying by region by more than do costs or, more straightforwardly,
by retaining the old company name for a “company” that only supplies in one area and
having another name out of area (e.g. npower uses the name Yorkshire Electricity only in
the Yorkshire distribution region).  The outcomes that result are illustrated in Table 2.
Here a Y means the company (listed along the top) supplies in the district in question
under that name.  Also shown is whether the company’s tariffs vary by area.
As a result of this discrimination coupled with the decision to go with a nationwide
brand, a particular problem faces Powergen (and faced TXU) when taking over other
companies, which we might label the “legacy trap”.  To illustrate, Powergen previously
competed with TXU for customers in the Eastern region; in order to capture customers, it
will have set lower prices there than did TXU and lower prices (in relation to costs) than
in its home region, East Midlands.  However in October 2002 it took control of TXU’s
supply business.  This means it faces a challenge, post-merger.  It either has the prospect
of retaining the identities separately, meaning that it might face competition from within
the company and increased costs, or it transfers all non-incumbent region TXU customers
to Powergen tariffs, retaining the TXU brand only for TXUs former incumbent areas plus
TXUs customers in East Midlands (a rather messy solution), or it merges the brands
entirely.  If it takes the last course, it seems that prices to old TXU customers in its
former incumbent regions will be reduced to Powergen levels, reducing profit on those
customers.  Otherwise, there will be two sorts of Powergen customers in (say) Eastern
region paying on different tariffs- those previously signed up for Powergen paying the
lower tariff.
A significant implication of this possibility for substantial discrimination is that
independent companies, not previously known for their ability to supply electricity face a
significantly tougher strategic challenge and lower profits prospect overall.  Indeed, it is
not clear what their “unique selling proposition” may be.  First, they have the expense of
getting themselves known, then they need to pitch their price and service offer such that it
offsets any remaining name recognition factor.  Thus there is evidence from the tariffs
they set that they need to pitch prices low relative to players already in the supply
business in order to gain custom.  In this context, it is notable that such players emphasise
price as the main factor in attracting customers, whilst incumbents commonly emphasise
the importance of service characteristics7.
It has been noted previously that it is difficult to glean hard information from interview
concerning pricing strategy (see e.g. Singh et al., 1998).  In our interviews we found that
firms tend to rely on vague statements concerning pricing relative to costs and relative to
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7competitors, but we have also found they do not necessarily aim to be competitive on
price if they feel their market positioning to be strong.  For a supplier, costs of fuel
purchase do differ according to the demand profile, but we uncovered little evidence of
supply companies attempting to use this positively in gaining domestic customers.
However, based upon the lowest price offers set out in Table 1 together with data on
pricing from earlier that year, we can identify features of particular companies’
“revealed” pricing strategies.  Considering the independents first, Amerada, Atlantic and
Basic Power all seem in practice to price around or below the median price.8 Amongst
these independents, Atlantic’s strategy is clearly to go for the larger -consuming direct
debit customers with a dual fuel offer and with more focus on Economy 7.  Basic power
has the most focused competitive strategy and has by far the greatest number of lowest
prices.  It only sells electricity and concentrates very much on the medium and high
consuming consumers, with a very strong offer across the regions of England and Wales
(it does not supply Scotland) including prepayment customers.  British Gas markets its
offer strongly but is seldom price competitive, with the main exception being prepayment
customers on Economy 7.
Turning to the established electricity market players, London Electricity is most
competitive on dual fuel for low and medium consumers and has a focus on the lower
consuming customers.  npower is more focused on dual fuel than anything else, but is not
particularly competitive.  Powergen is more competitive than any similar established
player, but is not as focused as Basic Power; it is comparatively good for low consumers
and has some focus on offering a good deal to prepayment customers.  Scottish Power,
Seeboard and Southern are not very price competitive and have little focus, except that
Southern is comparatively good for low consumers, TXU has something of a focus on
direct debit.  Thus from the evidence of this spread of low price offers, there is no real
head-to-head contest between the suppliers.  Of course in retrospect at least this is what
we might expect, based upon observation of competition in airline markets, for example.
It is interesting to note that only two companies, Amerada and Scottish Power, now offer
internet-only supplies (where the interface is via the internet, at least initially), perhaps
indicative of the relatively transparent nature of competition in this case.  Prices at these
two sites are lower than the companies’ off-line tariffs, but do not necessarily undercut
the best off-line offer. Of the two, neither is completely dominant, but Amerada offers the
better package in the vast majority of cases.  It is almost completely dominant in price
terms across medium and larger consumers, implying it seeks to dominate on this
channel, whereas Scottish Power is a better buy in the main for low consumers on the
standard credit tariffs.
One difference that is apparent between the initial position on liberalisation and now
relates to Prepayment customers.  In the first two years or so of competition, there seems
to have been a general perception that this was a type of customer best avoided as being
costly to serve (and may have problems paying for fuel).  As a result, whilst other
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8customer classes generally benefited from switching supplier, until at least mid- 2001 this
was the case only for a few regions’ Prepayment customers.  Tariffs that were offered by
new market participants were generally in excess of those available from their PES.  Now
however Basic Power in particular, but also Powergen, does offer significant savings for
this group of customers.  In electricity, much more than gas, they are a large segment of
the market. Sharratt and Brigham (2002) argue that for some companies low income
customers are perceived as a market niche, which cannot be ignored in the context of
market consolidation.
Moving away from the focus on price, several of the managers in the companies
interviewed claimed that service was an important element in their overall marketing
strategy (together with a “well-trained” sales force).  Indeed some view service as more
important than price or loyalty to an existing distributor.  Factors considered important in
service delivery include: attitude, availability, accessibility (ease of contact with the
company, including free phone numbers) and bundling, for example: “The difference is
not what we do but the way we do it, or that’s our aspiration…the services that we wrap
around it and then the move into other products and services is where we intend to
differentiate ourselves…” and “I believe we were the first to offer this dual fuel idea.”
and “…we’re going to seek to differentiate … through additional products and services”,
for another, “Moving away from the price message is good for us.”  More than one
company claims to provide the widest range of payment methods.  Methods for retaining
customers include capped price contracts for one to two year periods with price
guaranteed not to rise for a year or even two.
Despite many of the companies claiming to be offering or aspiring to offer excellent
service, there is some belief that it only matters if the company gets it badly wrong. For
example, the npower website states “we want to ensure you receive the highest standards
of service…” and “There are a number of Electricity Guaranteed Standards as well as
Overall Standards to ensure that you receive outstanding service.”   However, this same
company is criticised on the industry “watchdog” Energywatch website for its continuing
relatively high levels of complaints. (“npower’s record on transfers remains appallingly
high”, November 11, 2002).  In one of the second round interviews, in talking about how
to capture new customers, a respondent (from another company) commented “At this
point we are supposed to say fantastic service but we know we haven’t”.
4. Companies’ Strategic Actions and Outcomes
Presumably as a result of their poor competitive position, independent companies have
not fared well in terms of staying in the market long-term.  On August 2001, there was a
high-profile bankruptcy of one of the leading independents, Independent Energy.
Another, Cambridge Energy, sold out.  Amerada’s retail trading activities were taken
over by TXU in March 2002.  Managers in former PES companies in the market
speculate in the interviews as to how long the remaining independents can survive.
Indeed, some cynically suggest the independents are there merely to sell out their
acquired customer base to larger players.  Of course, there has also been significant
9consolidation amongst former PES companies, with a swift appreciation by all of the
potentially vulnerable position of the smaller players amongst them.  Table 3 charts this
consolidation process over the period of just over three years from the start of
competition in supply until the end of 2002.  The first column lists the major suppliers,
first the independents then the incumbents whilst the rightmost columns give the current
position of that firm.
By contrast with the independents, one thing that has become apparent is the powerful
strategic position of British Gas, a factor raised by several of the managers in the
remaining larger companies.  It has a well known name and an unparalleled national
position as a result of its incumbency in gas.  This, together with what is arguably clever
marketing and a large advertising budget, has enabled it successfully to pursue an
aggressive strategy in respect of signing up electricity customers; so much so that it may
be the largest domestic electricity supplier in Great Britain, as well as being the largest
gas supplier9.  The main marketing tools include emphasising its reputation and
experience, its customer service, its dual fuel deals, its range of allied services, and its
“zero standing charge” tariff (where it has the reputation of being the innovator, which
others dispute) rather than having a focus on price.  It has captured many electricity
customers despite not being particularly price competitive against other market entrants.
With the exception of Scotland (Scottish Gas), it is seldom below the median price
offering amongst entrants to the region for a customer with an average bill size; of course
its price is below the incumbent’s.
A clear impression from our interviews, particularly the first round of interviews, is that
many of the existing players see the market as having a shakeout of necessity- there are
too many players in the market.  There seems to be a consensus that there will eventually
be 4-5 supply companies, each serving 4-5 million customers, with British Gas quite
possibly dominant.  Presumably, this comes from a calculus relating likely margins
available, the degree of stickiness of some consumers, and marketing costs.  Indeed, it is
remarkable how far the market has progressed in terms of this “target”.  The lower part of
Table 3, correct as of December 2002, lists the major suppliers together with claimed
customer numbers.  Based upon this table, the process of consolidation is substantially
complete, with two surviving (but small) independents, plus British Gas, both the
Scottish-based integrated players, Powergen, London Electricity and npower.
However, the deeper question concerns why it is seen that four or five firms will survive
into the longer term.   Clearly, there are significant elements of cost of supply that are a
function of customer numbers, not consumption, so that if these cannot be priced
separately, each surviving firm will need a significant share of the market’s customers.
But it is also indicative that market players do not envisage price or promotional
competition being severe enough to cause a fall in numbers to, say, two players.  How
will the process develop further?
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In terms of profitability, given the relative prices it is true for the medium term that
existing customers are far more profitable than new customers.  Existing customers can
be charged more yet are less likely to switch supplier.  Thus a key aim of companies is to
retain as many as possible of their existing customers.  One of the main  mechanisms here
appears to be dual fuel.  By offering the “other” fuel relatively cheaply, the package of
both fuels can seem reasonably good value to the consumer compared with not changing
supplier at all, (though of course not compared with shopping around for both fuels, and
perhaps surprisingly, it is clear from the Energywatch website that dual fuel deals may
well not be the cheapest).
One question where there seems to be a range of views expressed in interviews concerns
targeting of new consumer types.  Here, as with service standards, there is some
dissonance between aspirations and reality as well, perhaps, as a reluctance to admit to
reality.  Clearly, each company wants to capture profitable new consumers.  But which
are profitable?  In general it is considered that those consuming large amounts of
electricity and paying by direct debit are the most profitable, since there are fixed costs in
serving customers that have to be covered.  On the other hand, repeated consumer
switching between suppliers for small advantages (churn) is running at high levels and is
a problem for all companies, meaning that signing up a customer in a crowded area of the
market may mean they do not stay as long as signing up someone in a relatively
unprofitable segment who may not be subject to churn.  Thus whilst most companies go
for the high consuming regular payers, there is potentially room for diverse strategies.
Indeed there is a clear appreciation that there are demand niches.
Linked with this is the question of how, as a supplier, to capture the ideal set of
consumers.  It is here that there is a gap between aspirations and reality.  Often suppliers
have clear targets.  Thus, for example from the first round of interviews, “so, from the
residential point of view our primary target is family with children, C1, C210, average age
of the parents over 30, average age of children over 5, household’s income in excess of
£30,000, that’s our primary target…”.  Yet, apart from Internet based sales methods,
which provide a minority of leads, most of the companies rely on doorstep selling and
incentivise their sales forces by paying them on results.  However the payments schemes
are not particularly sophisticated.  Therefore, the sales force tend to target areas where
they will make large numbers of conversions rather than being selective in ways the
suppliers would like.  This in turn means things as simple as targeting districts where it
does not take long to get to each front door.  The following quote is illustrative: “Well
when acquiring new customers we are obviously looking for profitable customers, we
would like to have customers with a high consumption because then we know we’ve got
the same fixed costs per customer, so they’ll be more profitable, but we can’t do that
much targeting because they tend to come in from the doorstep.”  From another company,
“…they [doorstep sellers] are not looking for the flash business up the drive, because
you’ll get thrown out…they are nevertheless looking for … in old-fashioned sociological
terms sort of Cs and Ds I suppose rather than As and Es.  Simply because… that’s the
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market they can get their biggest strike rate on…”.    Again, “…you cannot be very
selective using field sales…”.  This appears to be a very general phenomenon observed
across the companies and itself influences the degree of churn.
A further question on targeting, which can be controlled within doorstep selling methods,
concerns geographical focus.  Here it appears very common for the existing incumbents
to target their “halo areas”- those regions adjacent to the one in which they are an
incumbent.  This is in part because the margins available essentially rule out nationwide
television as a marketing tool for most players, in part because it is not clear why a
consumer would go for a particular company they had no affinity with (why should a
Cornishman go for Scottish Power, for example?).  Given the limited search in which
consumers engage (Giulietti et al, 2001), it is not necessary to be the cheapest in an area
in order to gain customers, provided you have some reputation, we were told.  Again, it is
worth noting that independent companies have no natural target in this sense unless (like
Amerada) they have built up a name already for gas sales into an area.
It is interesting to examine the extent to which incumbents have lost share, since this
differs a good deal across market areas.  Is price or reputation more important as a factor?
In particular, to investigate this relationship we have related losses of customers to
persistent price differences and to levels of complaints.  For the purposes of this exercise,
we have defined persistent price differences in two ways.  First we examine the
difference between the incumbent’s price for average consumption (weighting quarterly
bill and direct debit equally11) and the minimum average price from the cheapest supplier
for the first six months of 2002, second, the difference between the incumbent’s price and
the median price amongst other suppliers in the region, averaged in the same manner.
Market losses by region are obtained from the OFGEM website and relate to end-June
2002 (the latest available).  Complaints data used refer to the period June-August 2002.
These data are listed in Table 4, together with correlations between them. Clearly, all
these things are potentially endogenous- the firms choose prices and have policies which
(presumably to some extent) determine levels of complaints.  Having said this, given that
no one seeks to provide poor service, there is some weak evidence to suggest that higher
complaint levels are associated with greater proportions of consumers switching away.
There is an almost statistically significant (at 5%) positive correlation between the two.
The relationship between price differences and switching proportions across the supply
districts is particularly interesting.  Figure 1 plots one representation of this.  It can be
seen that there is some appearance of there being an upward sloping relationship,
meaning that the larger the percentage difference between the median supplier’s price and
the incumbent’s price the more likely are consumers to switch away from the incumbent.
However the relationship is clearly not statistically significant and neither does it bear on
the ultimate determinants of price differences.  Nevertheless it is interesting to note the
one complete outlier- the Scottish Hydro region.  This is the more northerly and rural of
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the two regions in Scotland; presumably it points to the lack of attractiveness of this area
for door-stepping campaigns.
In one further respect, there is a very significant difference between the originally
conceived industry architecture and that, which now prevails.  Recall that the original
conception was of vertical separation between supply (in England and Wales) and
generation.  In fact now, each of the major suppliers is in some sense vertically
integrated.  As well as the two Scottish generators- Scottish and Southern and Scottish
Power, the two major generators, Powergen and National Power (npower) have retail
arms, London Electricity is owned by EDF, a “generator” through the Interconnector, and
British Gas has obvious interests in a major raw material input.  Some companies in the
market clearly see these vertical links as an important element of competitive strategy,
although they do not specify quite why.  It is also interesting to note that the ultimate
owners of many of the operators are energy companies based in the US or continental
Europe; many interviewees particularly in the second round of interviews were of the
opinion that the only British company likely to remain in the market long term was
British Gas.
5. Concluding Remarks
Despite the seemingly homogeneous nature of the product, the UK domestic electricity
supply market is clearly not Bertrand in operation.  However, it does seem to be moving
towards a shared company vision in which a handful of players can co-exist as a result of
the interaction between typical cost structure and likely pricing levels achievable.  To
some extent, the degree of competition and competitiveness of pricing depend upon
consumer behaviour.  An interesting manifestation of this is the fact that although our
interviews suggest it costs around £50 to £60 per customer to attract new customers from
another player, recent purchases of companies that involve buying customers (amongst
other things) value customers of the incumbent several times higher. According to press
reports, in 2002 London Electricity paid £309 per SEEBOARD customer, and Powergen
£280 for customers of the ailing TXU company (Guardian, 22nd October 2002).  At the
other end of the spectrum, there is the problem (for companies) of “churn” arising from a
subset of consumers who switch supplier several times.  Other aspects are more a result
of strategic decisions of companies to focus on serving particular segments of the market.
In some senses, they are thwarted in this endeavour by the scattergun approach of
doorstep sales that many companies rely upon in signing up new consumers. Since this
gives rise to consumer complaints (see the Energywatch “compare” page) it is surprising
no significant alternative approach has emerged.  Nevertheless, given the significant
numbers that have switched away from their incumbent, as reported in Table 4, the
market is changing fairly rapidly.
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Table 1- A listing of “best buy” tariffs for the various submarkets in electricity
Supplier Atlantic Basic BG London npower Powergen Scottish Seeboard Southern and Scottish TXU Sum
User Tariff Detail
Low Direct debit Standard 1 3 7 2 3 16
Medium Direct debit Standard 2 12 14
High Direct debit Standard 2 12 14
Low Prepayment Standard 8 1 4 1 14
Medium Prepayment Standard 11 1 3 15
High Prepayment Standard 10 1 3 14
Low Standard Credit Standard 3 2 2 7 14
Medium Standard Credit Standard 8 1 4 1 14
High Standard credit Standard 12 2 14
Low Direct debit Econ 7 1 7 1 5 2 1 17
Medium Direct debit Econ 7 4 12 16
High Direct debit Econ 7 2 12 1 15
Low Prepayment Econ 7 8 3 5 16
Medium Prepayment Econ 7 11 3 2 16
High Prepayment Econ 7 11 3 14
Low Standard Credit Econ 7 4 1 6 4 15
Medium Standard Credit Econ 7 13 1 1 1 16
High Standard credit Econ 7 13 1 14
Low Direct debit Dual fuel 4 3 10 17
Medium Direct debit Dual fuel 5 2 3 1 1 4 16
High Direct debit Dual fuel 5 6 1 2 14
Low Standard Credit Dual fuel 12 2 14
Medium Standard Credit Dual fuel 6 1 5 2 14
High Standard credit Dual fuel 3 4 5 3 15
Low Direct debit Dual fuel econ 7 1 2 8 4 15
Medium Direct debit Dual fuel econ 7 13 1 1 15
High Direct debit Dual fuel econ 7 12 1 1 1 15
Low Standard Credit Dual fuel econ 7 4 9 1 14
Medium Standard Credit Dual fuel econ 7 3 11 14
High Standard credit Dual fuel econ 7 2 1 8 4 15
15
Number of "best buys" 47 165 20 44 30 82 6 13 17 22
Notes:
Data for December 2002.  Gas is not regionally priced in the same way, so in that case best buys
are constant across regions.  TXU, Powergen, Scottish Power and Atlantic are the key players in gas.
"Best buys" represent the lowest price bill, to the nearest pound, disregarding "special offers" such as airmiles.
Where numbers in rows add to more than 14, there are joint "best buys".
Source: Energywatch website, http://www.energywatch.org.uk/supplier_information/comparisons_of_price/index.asp
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Table 2- The pattern of offers by incumbents across areas
Supplier London npower Powergen Scottish Power Seeboard Southern/Scott
ish (Hydro)
TXU Yorkshire SWEB Swalec Southern Northern Manweb
Region
Yorkshire Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
SWEB Y Y Y Y Y Y
Swalec Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Southern Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
SEEboard Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Scottish Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Scot
Hydro
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Norweb Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Northern Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Midlands Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Manweb Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
London Y Y Y Y Y Y
Eastern Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
E Mids Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Different tariffs by area?
Incumbent electricity suppliers only, December 2002
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Table 3: The GB Electricity Supply Market Since 1998
Supplier Notes Entry Date Name change/ Exit (date) Current owner Holding Co
Amerada Initially a Gas supplier 08/01/01 Transferred to TXU then sold to Powergen (Oct-02) Powergen E.ON
Atlantic Electric and Gas Independent company 12/10/00 Atlantic
Basic Power Independent company 01/12/99 Utility Link (Jan-00)- later dropped Utility Link
British Gas Gas supplier Sep-98 Centrica BG
Cambridge Gas and Electricity Water company offshoot Apr-01 Local electricity supply only* Cambridge Water Union Fenosa
Energy Supplies UK Water company offshoot No longer actively marketing* Dee Valley
Independent energy Independent company Sep-98 Bankrupt- assets to npower, (Aug-01)
National Power Generator- purchased Midlands supply 30/06/99 Innogy/npower (21/09/99) innology/npower RWE
Powergen Generator- purchased East Midlands supply 27/07/98 Powergen E.ON
TXU Group Purchased Eastern Electricity 01/09/98 Eastern and Norweb relaunched as TXU Energi Powergen E.ON
Virgin Energy Operating under LE Group Early 2001 LE EDF
Eastern Electricity Incumbent Sold to TXU 01/09/98 Powergen E.ON
East Midlands Electricity Incumbent Sold to Powergen 27/07/98 Powergen E.ON
London Electricity Incumbent LE EDF
Manweb As Scottish Power Incumbent Scottish power
Midlands Electricity Incumbent Sold to National Power 30/06/99 innology/npower RWE
Northern Electricity Incumbent Sold to Innogy 21/09/01 innology/npower RWE
NORWEB Incumbent Sold to TXU 03/08/00 Powergen E.ON
Scottish Hydro Vertically integrated Incumbent Scottish and Southern
Scottish Power (south of
Scotland)
Vertically integrated Incumbent Scottish Power
Seeboard Incumbent Sold Jun-00 to AEP, July 02 to LE LE EDF
Southern As Scottish (Hydro) and Southern Incumbent Scottish and Southern
SWALEC Sold to British Energy 17/02/00 Incumbent Sold to Scottish and Southern Scottish and Southern
South Western Electricity Incumbent Sold to London Electricity 30/09/99 LE EDF
Yorkshire Electricity Incumbent 94.75% sold to Innogy 02/04/01 innology/npower RWE
Dec-02
Major Supply Groups Claimed Customer Numbers
BG/Centrica 18.6m 13m gas, 5.6m electric
Powergen 7.8m 5.5m electric, 2.3m gas
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npower 7m not broken down
Scottish and Southern 5m not broken down
Scottish Power 3.5m 2.6m electric, 0.9m gas?
LE 3m 2.5m electric
Notes: Data as of December 2002
Sources: OFGEM, Company corporate websites, newspaper and market reports, etc.
List may not contain all smaller but active operators
* No longer listed as a domestic electricity supplier in OFGEM's list
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Table 4: The relationship between switching, price differences and complaints
Money gap % gap Switchers Complaints Money gap % gap
Region from lowest % from median
EASTERN 26.23 11.66 35.00 0.031 15.54 6.91
EMID(Powergen) 29.75 12.89 39.00 0.041 15.45 6.69
LONDON 29.20 12.02 32.00 0.026 18.30 7.54
MEB 30.67 12.80 39.00 0.131 19.40 8.09
MANWEB 37.33 14.02 39.00 0.070 26.15 9.82
NORTHERN 51.25 20.32 41.00 0.131 27.24 10.80
NWEB 34.09 14.33 41.00 0.031 22.93 9.64
SEEBORAD 32.85 13.89 35.00 0.024 23.63 9.99
SCOT HYDRO 38.99 14.52 19.00 0.027 22.02 8.20
SCOT PWR 39.96 14.40 34.00 0.070 26.50 9.55
SOUTHERN 36.64 14.53 33.00 0.027 25.07 9.94
SWEB 34.03 12.85 31.00 0.026 22.57 8.52
SWALEC 40.83 14.26 33.00 0.027 26.36 9.21
YORKS 43.68 17.88 38.00 0.131 25.90 10.60
Column B C D E F G
Correlations
B 1.00
C 0.93 1.00
D 0.06 0.25 1.00
E 0.51 0.63 0.50 1.00
F 0.84 0.06 0.30 1.00
G 0.77 0.27 0.40 0.92 1.00
Notes:
"Money gaps" refer to the average price difference for an average consumer, weighting direct debit
 and standard credit customers equally, over the first 6 months of 2002 (Authors' calculations
based on Energywatch price tables).
Switchers % gleaned from OFGEM website, December 2002
Complaints refer to August 2002, from energywatch website
Data relate to incumbents only
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Figure 1: Switchers v median price 
difference
0
10
20
30
40
50
0 5 10 15
median percent price diff
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
s
w
i
t
c
h
i
n
g
Switchers
